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Abstract
Using a firm level dataset from four regions of Russia covering 1996/97, an
investigation was carried out into how the surplus created within the firm is divided
between profits and wages. An efficient bargaining framework based on the work of
Svejnar (1986) is employed which takes into account the alternative wage or outside
option available to employees in the firm as well as the value added per employee.
Statistical differences in the share of the surplus taken by employees employed in
state, private and mixed forms of firms are found. In addition, the results prove
sensitive to the presence of outliers and influential observations. A variety of
diagnostic methods are employed to identify these influential observations and robust
methods are employed to lessen the influence of them. Whereas in practice some of
the diagnostic and robust methods utilised proved incapable of identifying or
accommodating the gross outlier(s) in the data, the more successful methods included
robust regression, Winsorising, the Hadi and Siminoff algorithm, Cook’s Distance
and Covratio.
JEL Classification: C21, J300.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates wage determination in Russia. Wage equations derived from an
efficient bargaining model are estimated econometrically on a new firm-level dataset
for 1996–97 covering several thousand industrial and construction firms from four
regions of Russia. The central economic question investigated in the paper is how
wage determination is related to form of ownership. In particular, we ask whether the
degree of state ownership – full state ownership, fully privatised, or mixed state/private
ownership – is related to the share of the firm’s surplus taken by workers. Do workers
in state-owned firms take a larger share of the surplus than in private firms, as our ex
ante expectation of the nature of corporate governance would suggest? Is wage
determination in partially privatised firms more akin to that in state-owned or in private
firms?
The ‘outside option’ or ‘alternative wage’ – the expected income faced by workers
who leave a firm – plays an important role in wage bargaining models of this type. The
paper makes two contributions in this regard. First, we relax the usual modeling
assumption that the alternative wage is exogenous, and derive from the model the
implications of what happens when the wage set by a (large) firm has an impact on
wages set by other firms – a not unrealistic possibility for Russia, where labour markets
are highly segmented regionally, and wage setting by individual firms may have a
general impact on wage setting in the region. Second, in our empirical work we
calculate and work with a firm-specific alternative wage that is intended to capture
alternative employment possibilities within the same sector and region as the firm. The
motivation for this is again the regional segmentation of Russian labour markets.
Finally, our empirical investigation directly addresses a practical problem facing many
researchers conducting econometric analyses using data from transition countries – the
problem of ‘dirty data’ or outliers. Rather than deal with this problem in an ad hoc
way, as most investigators do, we employ a wide range of econometric methods of
outlier detection and robust estimation. We find that the econometric estimates of the
model can indeed be highly sensitive to the treatment of outliers. The general lesson
from this is that when investigators suspect the data they are using are ‘dirty’, they
should conduct and report a range of outlier detection and robust estimation
techniques.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and estimating
frameworks used in the paper. Section 3 discusses various econometric techniques for
outliers and robust estimation. The dataset used and the estimation results are
described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.4
2. Theoretical and Estimating Frameworks
2.1. Right-to-Manage vs. Efficient Bargaining
In attempting to model how insiders may raise their wage above the outside option or
‘alternative wage’ – the wage that can be expected to be earned by a worker were
he/she to leave his/ her current job – various approaches have been taken by different
researchers.
The question boils down to whether the firm is on its labour demand curve or on the
contract curve. This is often expressed as the right-to-manage model versus the
efficient bargaining model.
1 In the former model, the two sides within the firm –
management and workers – bargain over the wage but not employment, manangement
then sets the level of employment given the wage, and the outcome lies somewhere on
the labour demand curve. In the latter model, both parties bargain over wages and
employment and employment will be higher than if they bargain only over wages;
efficient from the perspective of the firm but not of society as a whole.
2
In its general form the right-to-manage model has a generalised Nash bargaining
solution which is the product of the weighted net gains to each party: the gain to
employees from expected income (from either employment in the firm or alternative
employment) over certain alternative employment, and the gain to the firm from profits
earned vs. shut-down or zero profits.
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where L is employment, w is the wage, wA is the alternative wage, u is utility from
wage income, Q is output,  wL pQ -  is firm profits, g is the bargaining strength of the
employees, and T can be interpreted as the number of all workers (in the Western
context, this would be union membership) including both those who end up being
employed by the firm and those who are not employed by the firm and take alternative
employment instead. The weights L/T and ( T L 1 - ) can be interpreted as the
probabilities faced by a representative worker of employment in the firm, and of having
to take alternative employment (including possibly being unemployed), respectively.
Bargaining (maximisation) is over the wage w, and the employment level L is chosen
by the firm to maximise profits. The efficient bargaining model has an identical setup,
with the simple difference that bargaining (maximisation) is over both the wage w and
the employment level L, i.e.,
                                                       
1 See, in particular, for a very good summary of the issues, Booth (1995).
2 See, however, Layard and Nickell (1990) who show that this is only true under limited assumptions.5
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Which of the two models would be more appropriate for modeling wage and
employment determination in the Russian transition economy is a difficult question, as
there is little micro empirical evidence on whether or how far bargaining within
Russian firms extends beyond wage bargaining to include bargaining over employment.
The labour hoarding that still continues today within Russian enterprises can be
interpreted either within an efficient bargaining model, or, in a right-to-manage
framework in which wages are extremely flexible, where employees have simply traded
off real wages for relative employment security and in the process moved (a long way)
down the labour demand curve.
3
In practice, however, the two models yield very similar estimating equations. As Booth
points out,
4 there is as yet no clear test to discriminate between the two models. For
our purposes, the choice of model is mostly one of convenience. We use in this paper
an efficient bargaining model by Svejnar (1986) that has also been used to estimate
wage equations in a transition context (Prasnikar et al., 1994 and 1997).
2.2. Estimating Framework
Svejnar (1986) sets out a Nash bargaining model of wage determination in which
unions have fixed memberships and maximise their members’ expected utility which is
taken as a function of income and employment; the firm’s utility is taken as equal to
their profit. In the context of a transition economy such as the Russian Federation it is
not labour unions but firm insiders that are seeking to maximise utility.
In Svejnar’s model, Y is total labour income and the union utility function V reflects
constant relative risk aversion:
( )
d
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and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
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Note d < 1 (d > 1) implies risk aversion (risk loving). Svejnar’s final estimating model,
conditional on d = 1, i.e., risk neutrality, is:
                                                       
3 See, e.g., Standing (1996) who argues that wages in Russia have been extremely flexible and the
main reason for low observed rates of unemployment.
4 Op. cit. p. 135.6
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where Y is the firm wage, Ya is the alternative wage or outside option, R is firm
revenue, H is non-labour costs, L is employment,
5  L / ) H L Y R ( valad a - - =  is the
value added per worker evaluated at Ya, and g as before is a measure of workers’
bargaining power. Value added per worker, valad, can be interpreted as the surplus
per worker generated by the firm above the amount workers would obtain if they took
up their outside option. Note that the main implication of the above equation is that the
measure of insider power, g  will also be the share of value added that workers take
over and above the outside option. A value of one indicates that all added value is
taken by the workers and so insiders have complete power. A value of zero indicates
that the insiders have no power and receive only the outside option as a wage.
We are particularly interested in the impact of ownership form on wage formation, and
therefore in the estimations we allow both for ownership-specific coefficients on valad
and ownership intercept dummies. The data allow us to distinguish between state-
owned firms, privatised firms, and ‘mixed’ firms with both state and private ownership
shares. Our prior expectations are that the share of value-added appropriated by
insiders will be larger in state-owned firms than in private firms because of the superior
corporate governance in the latter, with mixed firms being an intermediate case.
Currie (1991) in her study of teachers’ wages in Ontario uses an efficient contracts
model and a standard labour demand model. The alternative wage is assumed to be a
log-linear function of wages in surrounding school districts, average income in the
district, local manufacturing wages, and a local employment index. Ashenfelter and
Brown (1986) in their particular study of union branches belonging to the International
Typographical Union actually use eleven different measures of the alternative wage.
MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986) again using data on branches of the International
Typographical Union use a wage index representing the real hourly earnings received
by production workers in durable goods manufacturing. The point to note from this is
that there does not appear to be a universal method of calculating the definitive
alternative wage. It is very much a case of the particular circumstances determining the
approach to be taken.
                                                       
5 Under the assumption of risk neutrality, i.e., d = 1, Svejnar’s model leads to a vertical contract curve
and hence a unique value of employment which coincides with the socially efficient level of
employment, just as if the firm were on its labour demand curve paying its workers the outside option
or the alternative wage. This is a strong assumption especially given the situation within Russia.
Svejnar later swaps this assumption for one of a Cobb-Douglas production function which allows the
value of d to vary.7
If we wish to take into consideration unemployment and unemployment benefits then a
further complication arises. In the unemployment benefit system in the Russian
Federation that has been in place since the early 1990s, there is no single measure of
unemployment benefit. Benefit is calculated as a percentage of the worker’s average
pay over the final three months of employment. At the time of writing the worker
receives 0.75 of this figure for a total of three months; a further 0.6 of their previous
average pay for a maximum of four months after the first three months have expired
and a final 0.45 for a remaining five months with the possibility of a further six months
on top of this after a review. This is further complicated by the fact that there is a
minimum and a maximum which the claimant can receive. If in the first three months
their calculated benefit exceeds the maximum then it is this maximum figure that they
receive and not the 0.75 of their previous average wage. The final complication is that
this maximum and minimum varies from oblast to oblast since it is calculated on a
monthly basis using a basket of local consumer goods and hence local prices as
opposed to the average price level for the country as a whole.
The Russian labour market is highly segmented, with very little labour mobility
between regions. Labour skills are also sector-specific. This implies that the alternative
wage faced by a worker in a firm will be the wage in alternative employment in a
similar firm in the same region of Russia. Our strategy is to estimate the wage equation
in which the alternative wage is calculated for each firm as the average wage in all
other firms in the same sector and region; in other words, we make the alternative
wage firm-specific:
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where n is the number of firms in a particular sector in a particular region.
We also recognise that recorded unemployment rates are likely to understate the
difficulty a departing worker will have in finding a new job; although observed
unemployment rates in Russia are low, outflow rates from unemployment are also low.
We therefore do not use observed unemployment rates to weight the alternative wage
but instead the coefficient on the alternative wage to vary from unity. Our prior
expectation here is that the coefficient will be positive but significantly less than one.
Our estimating equation is therefore:
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where i is used to index observations on individual firms and the coefficients denoted
‘private’ and ‘mixed’ are intercept and slope coefficients relating to the relevant
ownership dummy variables. We also include regional and industry dummy variables in
the estimation.
2.3. The Alternative Wage - Exogenous or Endogenous
Finally, there is a question mark on the endogeneity of the alternative wage. Lockwood
and Manning (1989) have shown that in a dynamic framework all variables that affect
firm profits will influence employment determination. However, for the purposes of the
regressions, we have assumed, as Svejnar himself does, that the alternative wage is
exogenous. This issue is, however, taken up when we allow the firm wage to vary with
the alternative wage.
In Svejnar (1986), as in the literature generally, the alternative wage is taken as
exogenous and the change in the firm’s own wage is not seen to have any influence on
the alternative wage. However, it can be argued that if the individual firm is large
enough relative to the size of the branch in which it is operating, then any change in the
firm wage will be noticed by workers in other firms who will recalculate their
alternative wage on the basis of the new wage that they now see in effect in the other
(large) firm. A change in the alternative wage for these workers will, as shown by
McDonald and Solow (1981), lead to a leftward movement of their contract curve and
so to a higher wage. The workers who originally began the process see that their
alternative wage has increased and so their contract curve will move to the left and a
higher wage will result.
The above mirrors, to a degree, the annual wage round within Britain in the sixties and
seventies in particular when individual unions were keen ‘to maintain differentials’ and
maintain their position within a pay league relative to other groups of workers. We
have reworked Svejnar’s basic model for his estimating equation but allow Ya, the
alternative wage, to be a function of Y, the firm wage.
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In a two-party framework the bargaining process is the maximisation of the above
equation. This leads to the following steps:
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where A equals  i a Y Y ¶ ¶ . In the Svejnar model this conjectural variation has a value of
zero. Now we allow it to vary. One would expect a priori that it would take a value
between zero and one. If groups of workers are primarily concerned with keeping their
relative positions in some kind of pay league then a value of one would imply
unchanged positions in any ranking and a value of less than one would imply that the
‘distance’ between groups of workers is widening. It can be shown that allowing the
alternative wage to be endogenous results in the following formulation (see
Appendix 1).
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This should be compared with equation (5) from the original model:
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Thus if the wage set by a firm has an impact on the alternative wage, i.e., on the wages
set by other firms, the effect is to decrease the share of the surplus taken by the insiders
of the firm, and the estimated coefficient on value added per worker will decrease.
3. Econometric Techniques for Outliers and Dirty Data
‘An outlying observation, or ‘outlier’, is one that appears to deviate
markedly from other members of the sample in which it occurs.’
6
‘Outliers occur very frequently in real data, and ... may totally spoil a least
7
As is well known, there is a general problem with the reliability of data reporting
within Russia. This arises for two reasons. Firstly, there is a problem related to the
recording of the data by the relevant state statistical bodies.
8 Outliers arising from this
fall within the realm of what are described as ‘non-statistical factors’.
The second problem is potentially more serious and arises from contamination from
another distribution other than the one under consideration. Here we are concerned
with statistical factors that might help us explain why outliers occur, how they can be
                                                       
6 Grubbs (1969) quoted by Barnett and Lewis (1994).
7 Rousseeuw and Leeroy (1987).
8 To give but a few examples from the data we use in this paper.  Two firms apparently paid negative
wages to their workforces. Another two recorded negative fixed capital. A file containing observations
on trade related firms within the Moscow area had several hundreds of duplicate observations
masquerading as unique observations. In the original data that were obtained, the area or regional
Goskomstat offices were using different units of account to measure the financial totals of some
variables; for example, the fixed capital figures from the Chuvash file had to be divided by 1000 to
ensure the same units were used throughout.10
detected and if necessary whether they should be removed. For example, we may wish
to examine the distribution of sales of Russian enterprises. If 60 per cent of enterprises
report truthfully, but 40 per cent do not, then in effect we have two distributions
masquerading as one.
Even if we assume there is no contamination, extreme values may well occur which
have been truthfully reported and recorded by the relevant statistical body. Should
these values be deleted, ignored or somehow accommodated? As Thomas (1997)
writes, ‘... most econometricians prefer to retain unusual observations in their
datasets’. But he continues, ‘However, because OLS is so sensitive to such
observations, other methods of observation are sometimes employed’. Reiss (1990)
comments, ‘When an observation is both an outlier and influential, investigators usually
report regression results both with and without the observation’. Using a variety of
econometric techniques that take on board the presence of outliers within the data, we
present results based on the model outlined above. We focus in particular on the
estimated relationship between ownership structure and the distribution of surplus
(value added) and how it is affected by the removal of outliers; in other words, how
robust are the findings?
There are two types of outliers.  One is where the residual formed from the difference
between the fitted  i Y ˆ  and the actual  i Y  shows up as particularly large. The second is
where the  i X  is far from the mass of  i X ’s. This means, for example, that an outlier
will cause the direction of the fitted line to change but this will not show up in a high
residual. This is a leverage point and the observation is usually referred to as
influential. While outliers and influential observations are conceptually different it is
not unusual to see influential observations simply referred to as outliers.
Identifying outliers when there is only one contained within a dataset is relatively
straightforward. If there is more than one then problems can arise from what is known
as masking and swamping effects. Masking occurs when a subset of outliers is not
detected because of the presence of another subset, usually close to the former.
Swamping, on the other hand, occurs when ‘normal’ observations are taken as outliers
by the detection process because of the presence of another subset of observations.
One approach to outlier identification is to make use of the residuals from the model
estimation. However, given the normal error model the difficulty arises that the
estimated residuals do not have constant variance (Behnken and Draper, 1972). The
variance of the OLS residuals is given by:
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As can be seen the i
th individual residual is not homoskedastic and is more variable the
closer the  i x  explanatory variable is to the overall mean. This ‘ballooning’ effect, as it11
is known, would have to be taken into account if it is pronounced when examining the
size of residuals as an indication that it is an outlier.
In addition it can also be shown that the OLS residuals have different y’s in common
and so are correlated, i.e.,
( ) ￿
„
+ - =
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where h represents the hat matrix. It is partly for the above reasons that some
researchers prefer to use other types of residuals when constructing diagnostic tests.
The description of these and the outlier detection/robust methods are described more
fully in Appendix 2.
As Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) point out, approachs to outlier detection can be
placed in one of two camps. They distinguish between robust regression and outlier
diagnostics. Regression diagnostics attempts to identify observations that are
potentially anomalous in the dataset after applying a regression and then examining the
residuals (of whatever hue). One may then decide to keep or delete the outliers having
studied them. One of the criticisms thrown at regression diagnostics is that it employs
the residuals from the regression. However, the size of the residual is not necessarily
any guide to whether the observation is an outlier or not since leverage points will have
small residuals.
Robust regression, on the other hand, tries to lessen or to accommodate the influence
of any outlying observations in the estimators employed so that it is not necessary to
remove them at all as their influence is downweighted. Some diagnostic methods
attempt to take this on board (Cook’s Distance, for example) by calculating the
leverage of the residual as well as the size of the residual. The methods employed in
our study are summarised below.
Diagnostic Techniques Robust Estimation
Dffits Median Least Squares (MLS)
Cook’s Distance Reweighted Least Squares (RLS)
Welsch Distance Winsorising
Covratio Non-Linear Least Squares
Hadi and Simonoff Procedure (HSP) Robust Regression
This is not an exhaustive list, nor is this the first time a comparison has been made of
different techniques on a dataset (see e.g., Cook and Weisberg, 1982, and Belsley
et al., 1980). This paper is to our knowledge, however, the first time that such
techniques have been applied and compared using a micro dataset from a transition
economy such as the Russian Federation.12
4. The Dataset and Summary Statistics
The data cover a three year period from 1995 to 1997 and come from Goskomstat, the
Russian Federation state statistical body. The information is collected from all medium-
sized and large firms, of all categories of ownership – state-owned, privatised, and
‘mixed’ firms with both private and state ownership shares. The four regions covered
are Moscow City, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Chuvashia Republic and Chelyabinsk Oblast.
9 The
data cover all medium and large industrial and construction firms in these regions.
10
As argued above, it is appropriate in the Russian case to treat the alternative wage as
region- and sector-specific. Alternative wages at the two-digit branch level were
calculated as follows.
11 First, the ‘branch wage fund’ and ‘branch employment’ were
calculated for each of the four regions in the data. Second, for each firm, that firm’s
wage fund and employment level were subtracted from the branch wage fund and
branch employment, respectively, to generate an alternative branch wage fund and an
alternative employment level (given the same branch and location). Finally, the former
divided by the latter gives the alternative wage for each firm. The alternative wage thus
calculated can be interpreted as the wage a worker would expect, on average, if
leaving his current job and taking a job in a different firm in the same branch in the
same region.
The wage fund is made up of monetary payments for labour activities performed and
of payments in kind. The fund takes in incentive payments, bonuses and special
payments connected with the conditions of work (dangerous or harmful conditions,
night working, overtime payments etc.). Also included in the wage fund are regular
payments on food, fuel and living accommodation that are received by the workforce
either as a result of agreements between the workforce and management or due to
legislation. Paid holidays, leave for training and professional retraining are also
included in this. The average wage for each firm was calculated as the firm wage fund
divided by the average listed number of workers.
Value added per worker is calculated as the sum of the wage fund and reported profits,
less the alternative wage (see above). Profit is calculated according to the standard
Russian definition except that it is gross of depreciation. Depreciation is not reported
directly in the data but is instead estimated for each firm using reported fixed capital
and the average depreciation rate for Russian industries reported in the annual
statistical yearbook published by Goskomstat.
                                                       
9 The reasons for choosing them as representative economic regions within the Russian Federation are
discussed in Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1998).
10 The raw data also cover wholesale and retail trade firms, but missing data meant there was an
insufficient number of firms from these sectors to be included in the study.
11 The two-digit levels means, for example, the fuel sector (11), ferrous and non-ferrous metals (12),
machine construction (14) and so on.13
Tables 1–2 present summary statistics for the data that relate to those observations
actually used in the regression analysis, i.e., excluding firms with incomplete data.
Output and output per worker, while not used in the estimating equation, are also
presented.
12 All financial data are current prices in millions of rubles.
5. Estimation Results
Table 3 below gives the results obtained from using the above methods on the dataset
when applied to the basic model estimated in levels for the year 1997. The first column
reports the results of estimating the model on the full sample of data using ordinary
least squares (OLS). Subsequent columns report estimation after deletion of outliers
and/or using the named robust estimation technique. The number of observations
dropped as outliers in each estimation is reported in the last row of the table. The
omitted regional intercept dummy variable is Chelyabinsk.
Starting first with outlier detection methods, several results are worth stressing. In
general the largest reduction in the residual sum of squares caused by the removal of a
subset of n observations from a dataset are seen as the most likely candidates to be
outliers (Gentleman and Wilk, 1975). Put another way the greatest increase in the R
2 is
one way to discriminate between different outlier detection methods. On that basis, the
Hadi and Simonoff procedure (HSP) performs best – the R
2 increases from 0.29 with
the full sample to 0.66 when the outliers are deleted. Cook’s distance and covratio are
next with R
2 ’s of 0.47 and 0.48, respectively. Welsch’s distance and Dffits, however,
actually decrease the R
2 by the deletion of their outliers.
Turning to the robust estimation techniques two methods stand out – winsorising and
robust regression. In the latter case, an R
2 is not applicable because of the weighting
procedure. The coefficents generated by robust regression are close to Cook’s
distance, which follows from the fact that this robust regression technique uses Cook’s
distance initially to remove ‘gross outliers’ (see Appendix 2). The R
2 from the
winsorised regression is of the same magnitude as the HSP and the coefficients
produced between the two methods are, relatively speaking, very similar.
In the course of the study it was found that there was one very influential observation.
Its deletion results in a dramatic change in the coefficients and in the value R
2 – see the
final column in Table 3, ‘Minus One’. The coefficient on value added per employee, for
example, jumps from 0.001 to 0.27; on the interactive dummies for value added per
employee they change from 0.071 and –0.001 to –0.198 and –0.270 for private and
mixed property firms, respectively.
Further examination of the results reported in Table 3 show that the estimation results
can be separated into two groups: those in which the estimated coefficient on value
                                                       
12 A small number of firms do not report output data but report profit, wage and employment data and
hence can be included in the regression analysis.14
added per worker is extremely small, about 0.001 – OLS applied to the full sample,
Dffits, Welsch’s distance, non-linear least squares, and median least squares – and
those in which the estimated coefficient is between 0.27 and 0.33, values that are
relatively reasonable and consistent with our prior expectations – HSP, Cook’s
distance, Covratio, robust regression, Winsorising, and ‘Minus One’. What is
happening is that the HSP, Cook’s distance, covratio, robust regression and
Winsorising methods pick up this gross outlier while the other methods do not.
With one dependent variable and one regressor a graph of y against x can be displayed
along with the fitted line of a regression. Outlying observations then stand out for the
eye to see. The added variable plot is a diagnostic tool that is an attempt to do the
same but for models where there is more than one regressor. In our case, we can see
graphically whether value added per employee has any outliers by creating an added
variable plot with the residuals from a regression of value added per employee on all
other explanatory variables on the X-axis, and the residuals from a regression of the
firm wage on all the right-hand side variables except value added per employee on the
Y-axis. Figure 1 shows such a plot for our basic regression for 1997, with each
observation marked by a ‘1’ if the HSP outlier detection process deemed it an outlier
and a zero otherwise. The added variable plot in Figure 1 is quite dramatic and shows
the value of this diagnostic tool. The outlier is clearly a classic leverage point that
because of the extreme distance that it lies from the other points gives the mistaken
impression of the rest of the observations forming a vertical line.
Figure 1: Added-variable plot using value-added per worker in 1997
coef = .00089347, se = .00043758, t = 2.04
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This gross outlier provides an acid test for the regression diagnostics employed along
with the robust estimating techniques. The observation is contained within the
Krasnoyarsk region, is a state-owned firm and is in the construction sector. Statistical
information on it and the rest of the data are presented separately in Table 4. It can be
seen that this firm has an extremely high value of profits per worker, with
unremarkable values for the other variables. We note that this outlier is not the result
of a simple reporting error – the same firm reports a very large value for profit in the
preceding year, 1996, as well.
Our first conclusion, therefore, is that even sophisticated outlier detection methods and
robust estimation techniques can fail to detect a gross outlier whose presence in the
dataset can have an overwhelming influence on the regression results.
Compared to the coefficients on value added per employee the coefficients on the
alternative wage are relatively stable regardless of which technique is employed. The
value of the coefficient varies from 0.538 to 0.720. This is significantly less than unity,
and is consistent with our prior expectations (see above).
We turn now to the estimated coefficients on value added per worker for the different
ownership categories, considering only the results from the six methods that excluded
the gross outlier: HSP, Cook’s distance, Covratio, robust regression, Winsorising, and
simple exclusion of the gross outlier (‘Minus One’). The benchmark ownership
category is state-owned firms; the interactive coefficients on valad97 reported for
private and mixed firms are deviations from this benchmark category. The value of the
share of the surplus taken by insiders for these ownership categories is obtained from
the sum of the benchmark (state) coefficient and the estimated coefficient. For
example, the coefficient on valad97 in the HSP results is 0.339, indicating that workers
in state-owned firms appropriate 33.9 per cent of the available surplus. The coefficient
on private*valad97 is –0.045, indicating that workers in private firms appropriated –
4.5 per cent less than workers in state-owned firms, or 29.4 (33.9 – 4.5) per cent of
the available surplus.
All six methods show that the share of the surplus taken by workers in private firms is
significantly less than that taken by workers in state-owned firms; the range of the
estimated difference is from 4.2 percentage points less (Covratio) to 19.8 percentage
points less (‘Minus One’). Note that the value of the coefficient for ‘Minus One’ is
significantly larger that those for the other methods, suggesting that the other methods
are detecting and excluding other, less gross, outliers.
The results for mixed ownership firms are themselves rather mixed. The estimations for
the HSP and winsorising show that the shares of surplus taken by workers in mixed
ownership firms are close to the shares taken by those in private firms, whereas the
results for Cook’s distance, covratio, robust regression, and ‘Minus One’ indicate that
workers in mixed ownership firms are appropriating much smaller shares of the surplus
than in either state-owned or private firms. Indeed, the coefficient on mixed*valad9716
in these latter results is approximately the same magnitude as, but opposite in sign
from the coefficient on valad97 – indicating, in other words, that workers in mixed
firms have zero bargaining strength and are appropriating none of the firms’ surplus.
The former set of results – bargaining power in mixed firms similar to that of private
firms – is more or less consistent with our prior expectations, the interpretation being
that private ownership leads to lower bargaining power for workers regardless of
whether it is full or partial private ownership. The latter set of results – workers in
mixed firms have no bargaining power at all – is, however, harder to explain. One
possibility, of course, is that the latter results are generated by outliers remaining in the
sample but that are removed or attenuated by the HSP or Winsorising procedures; this
is consistent with the fact noted above that the latter two procedures score highly in
terms of the increase in R
2. In any case, the results for mixed firms demonstrate again
the sensitivity of results to the treatment of outliers.
The next step in our investigation is to consider a wider range of estimations –
covering 1996 as well as 1997, estimating using instrumental variables as well as OLS,
and estimating in first-differences to allow for firm-specific fixed effects – but
employing a smaller range of robust/outlier estimation methods. Based on the results
above, using as our criteria the improvement in R
2 and consistency with prior
expectations, we choose the HSP and Winsorising methods. We also report, for
reference, the estimation results for the full sample, and for the full sample minus the
gross outlier (‘Minus One’). Value added per worker is instrumented with its lagged
value from the previous year; all other variables are treated as exogenous. The results
are reported in Tables 5–9. Regional and industry (construction) dummy variables
were included in the estimations but are not reported for reasons of brevity.
OLS results for 1996 (Table 5) and 1997 (Table 6) are very similar for both the HSP
and Winsorising procedures: in both years the share of the surplus taken by workers in
state-owned firms is estimated to be approximately 31 to 34 per cent, with shares
taken by workers in private and mixed firms about 4 to 9 percentage points less than
this; as noted earlier, the estimated shares taken by workers in private and mixed firms
are very similar using these estimation methods. The estimation results when simply the
gross outlier is excluded are, however, rather unstable, with the results for 1996 and
1997 changing quite sharply.
Tables 7 and 8 report results for instrumental variable estimation. The results reported
for 1996 are generally poor, with few significant coefficients. The reason for this is
unclear and may be related to the fact that we did not check for outliers amongst the
instruments; further investigation is needed here. The 1997 IV estimation does not
have these problems; the results are quite good and qualitatively similar to the OLS
results for that year. Compared to the previous 1997 estimations, the coefficient on
valad97 is somewhat higher at 0.39 (Winsorising) or 0.43 (HSP), indicating that, when
account is taken of simultaneity, the estimated share of the surplus taken by workers in
state-owned firms is somewhat higher, at about 40 per cent. The results for private and17
mixed firms are similar to each other, indicating workers take a share of the surplus
that is about 10 percentage points lower than that taken by workers in state firms. The
IV coefficients for private and mixed firms using the HSP and Winsorising methods are
therefore a bit higher than the OLS coefficients using these methods – workers in these
firms are taking about 30 per cent of the surplus.
Finally, Table 9 reports the results of estimation in first differences. The results here,
by contrast with those reported above, are somewhat inconclusive. The HSP and
Winsorising results indicate that workers in state-owned firms are taking a smaller
share of the surplus than when estimated in levels – 14 per cent (Winsorising) or 16
per cent (HSP). All but one of the ownership coefficients are insignificant, meaning we
are unable to detect significant differences between the process of wage determination
in state firms and private or mixed firms. Finally, even the alternative wage, highly
significant in all the previous estimations, is insignificant in our first-differences results.
A possible explanation for these poor results, and for the insignificant coefficient on
the alternative wage in particular, is that measurement error is overwhelming the true
changes in the underlying variables.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the relationship of ownership form to wage
determination in Russia using a firm-level dataset that includes several thousand
industrial and construction firms from four representative regions of Russia. Our
empirical results can be summarised as follows.
We find that wage determination is indeed related to ownership form in Russia.
Workers in state-owned firms take a larger share of their firm’s surplus than workers in
private (privatised) firms. Interestingly, the share of the surplus taken by workers in
firms with mixed state/private ownership is similar to that in fully private firms. These
results can be interpreted as suggesting that corporate governance (wage setting) is
more disciplined in private firms, and that partial privatisation is enough to generate
this improved wage discipline.
We also find that our results are highly sensitive to the treatment of outliers in the data,
and the conclusions above must be taken with this caveat in mind. There is no easy
answer to this problem – remarkably, we found that several outlier detection and
robust estimation techniques were unable to detect a single gross outlier, the
inclusion/exclusion of which had a huge impact on our estimation results. Our strategy
was to use a wide range of such techniques, report the results of all of them, and then
investigate further using a subset of these techniques that generated results that were
reasonable on both statistical grounds and on the grounds of consistency with prior
expectations based on theory and other evidence. We would recommend that other
researchers do the same when employing problematic data – as data from transition
countries often are.18
References
Ashenfelter, Orley and James N. Brown (1986), ‘Testing the Efficiency of Employment
Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), pt.2, pp. 40–80.
Barnett, V. and T. Lewis (1994), Outliers in Statistical Data, New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc.
Behnken, D. A. and N. R. Draper (1972), ‘Residuals and their Variance Pattern’,
Technometrics, 14, pp. 101–11.
Belsley, D., E. Kuh and R. E. Welsch (1980), Regression Diagnostics, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Bollen, K. A. and R. W. Jackman (1990), ‘Regression Diagnostics: An Expository
Treatment of Outliers and Influential Cases’, In: Fox, J. and J. S. Long (eds.),
Modern Methods of Data Analysis, Newbury Park: Sage Publications,
pp. 257-91.
Booth, A. L. (1995), The Economics of the Trade Union, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Brown, D. (1996), ‘Excess Labour and Managerial Shortage: Findings From a Survey
in St. Petersburg’, Europe Asia Studies, 48(5), pp. 811–35.
Chatterjee, S. and A. S. Hadi (1988), Sensitivity Analysis in Linear Regression, New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Cook, R. D. (1977), ‘Detection of Influential Observations in Linear Regression’,
Technometrics, 19, pp. 15–18.
Cook, R. D. and S. Weisberg (1982), Residuals and Influence in Regression, New
York: Chapman and Hall.
Currie, J. (1991), ‘Employment Determination in a Unionised Public-Sector Labour
Market: The Case of Ontario’s School Teachers’, Journal of Labour Economics,
9(1), pp. 45–66.
Draper, N. R. and H. Smith (1996), Applied Regression Analysis, New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Gentleman, J. F. and M. B. Wilk (1975), ‘Detecting Outliers II: Supplementing the
Biometrics, 31, pp. 387–410.
Greene, W. H. (1993), Econometric Analysis, 2nd. Edition, Prentice-Hall International
Inc., p. 288.
Grubs, F. E. (1969), ‘Procedures for detecting outlying observations’, Technometrics,
11, pp. 1–21.
Hadi, A. S. and J. S. Simonoff (1993), ‘Procedures for the Identification of Multiple
Journal of the American Statistical Association,
88(424), pp. 1,265–72.
Layard, R. and S. Nickell (1990), ‘Is Unemployment Lower if Unions Bargain Over
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 105(3), pp. 773–87.
Lehmann, H., J. Wadsworth and A. Acquisti (1998), ‘Grime and Punishment: Job
Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation’, William Davidson
Institute Working Paper Series, Ann Arbor, Michigan.19
Lockwood, B. and A. Manning (1989), ‘Dynamic Wage-Employment Bargaining with
Economic Journal, 99, pp. 1,143–58.
MaCurdy, T. E. and J. H. Pencavel (1986), ‘Testing Between Competing Models of
Wage and Employment Determination in Unionised Markets’, Journal of
Political Economy, 94(3), pt 2, pp. S3–S39.
McDonald, I. and R Solow (1981), ‘Wage Bargaining and Employment’, American
Economic Review’, 71(5), pp. 896–908.
Prasnikar, J., J. Svejnar, M. Dubravko and V. Prasnikar (1994), ‘Behaviour of
Participatory Firms in Yugoslavia: Lessons for Transforming Economies’, The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(4), pp. 728–41.
Prasnikar, J., J. Svejnar and K. Matjaz (1997), ‘Investment and Wages in the Slovenian
Firms During the Transition’, working paper, draft copy.
Reiss, P. C. (1990), ‘Detecting Multiple Outliers with an Application to R&D
Journal of Econometrics, 43, pp. 293–315.
Rousseeuw, P. J. and A. M. Leeroy (1987), ‘Robust Regression and Outlier
Detection’, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Standing, G. (1996), ‘Russian Unemployment and Enterprise Restructuring –
Reviving Dead Souls’, London: Macmillian Press, Chapter 5: The Paradox of
Wage Flexibility.
Svejnar, J. (1986), ‘Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements:
Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry’, Econometrica, 54(5), pp. 1,055–78.
Thomas, R. L. (1997), Modern Econometrics – An Introduction, Harlow: Addison
Wesley Longman.
Welsch, R. E. and E. Kuh (1977), Technical Report 923-77: Linear Regression
Diagnostics, Cambridge, MA: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.21
Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Ownership Category
1996 obs. Total Sample Mean (St.
Dev)
obs. State Firms Mean (St.
Dev)
obs. Privatised Firms
Mean (St. Dev)
obs. Mixed Firms Mean
(St. Dev)
Employment 2331 612.81 (2497.06) 705 324.75 (1018.85) 605 508.01 (1099.96) 1021 873.83 (3560.68)
Average Wage 2331 10.52 (8.12) 705 9.19 (6.06) 605 11.82 (10.97) 1021 10.66 (7.19)
Alternative wage 2331 11.84 (4.68) 705 11.97 (4.56) 605 12.01 (4.42) 1021 11.65 (4.90)
Output 2201 59866.98 (424332.6) 664 18821.24 (81146.91) 564 44635.67 (203249 1) 973 96706.47
(613576.3)
Output per Employee 2201 61.14 (105.69) 664 40.31 (49.47) 564 69.09 (82.86) 973 70.76 (138.60)
Profit 2331 8766.08 (130374.4) 705 4317.56 (39129.45) 605 4252.32 (12240.87) 1021 14512.44
(193967.2)
Profit per Employee 2331 64.04 (1928.052) 705 23.99 (487.17) 605 8.57 (16.35) 1021 124.57 (2884.63)
1997 obs. Total Sample Mean (St.
Dev)
obs. State Firms Mean (St.
Dev)
obs. Privatised Firms
Mean (St. Dev)
obs. Mixed Firms Mean
(St. Dev)
Employment 2355 560.10 (2319.89) 707 299.41 (944.07) 615 463.50 (1024.93) 1033 796.03 (3306.60)
Average Wage 2355 12.50 (8.56) 707 11.06 (7.62) 615 13.39 (8.64) 1033 12.96 (8.99)
Alternative wage 2355 14.47 (5.51) 707 14.67 (5.39) 615 14.61 (5.22) 1033 14.24 (5.74)
Output 2226 61045.46 (428830.1) 661 20822.06 (98035.58) 577 48959.52 (227310.1) 988 95014.34
(612904.2)
Output per Employee 2226 68.16 (109.04) 661 45.48 957.32) 577 79.71 (119.91) 988 76.59 (125.38)
Profit 2355 11957 (232431.7) 707 4549.91 (48360.52) 615 5066.77 (27904.09) 1033 21128.63 (347875)
Profit per Employee 2355 42.29 (864.89) 707 27.56 (624.83) 615 9.31 (41.12) 1033 72.01 (1198.54)22
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Industry Category
obs. Industry Mean 1996
(St. Dev)
obs. Industry Mean 1997
(St. Dev)
obs. Construction Mean
1996
(St. Dev)
obs. Construction Mean
1997
(St. Dev)
Employment 1768 712.26 (2817.66) 1789 651.49 (2618.76) 562 300.52 (872.73) 565 271.12 (781.90)
Average Wage 1768 9.74 (6.36) 1789 11.71 (7.75) 562 12.97 (11.76) 565 15.02 (10.35)
Alternative wage 1768 10.82 (3.97) 1789 13.29 (4.91) 562 15.06 (5.26) 565 18.20 (5.63)
Output 1730 71120.83 (476957.8) 1751 72516.11 (482223.9) 498 17515.4 (59928.69) 500 17807.37 (48028.62)
Output per Employee 1730 62.39 (114.18) 1751 67.36 (101.29) 498 53.45 (65.06) 500 67.53 (131.41)
Profit 1768 7000.49 (93495.98) 1789 12223.78 (255011.7) 562 14142.3 (207377.9) 565 10883.02 (138896.1)
Profit per Employee 1768 6.54 (18.47) 1789 5.98 (29.59) 562 244.39 (3923.67) 565 156.59 (1761.20)23
Table 3: Regression Diagnostics and Robust Estimation for 1997
Full
Sample
Hadi
&
Simonoff
Dffits Cook’s
Distance
Welsch’s
Distance
Covratio Non
Linear
Least
Squares
Median
Least
Squares
RLS Robust
Regression
Winsor Minus
One
valad 97 0.001 0.339 0.001 0.277 0.001 0.248 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.346 0.340 0.270
(0.000)* (0.012)** (0.000)** (0.013)** (0.000)* (0.013)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.010)** (0.012)** (0.015)**
private*valad97 0.071 –0.045 0.047 –0.095 0.055 –0.042 0.070 0.202 0.215 –0.111 –0.073 –0.198
(0.007)** (0.016)** (0.006)** (0.017)** (0.007)** (0.016)** (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.010)** (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.016)**
mixed*valad97 –0.001 –0.061 –0.001 –0.263 –0.001 –0.235 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 –0.346 –0.087 –0.270
(0.000) (0.014)** (0.000)** (0.013)** (0.000)** (0.013)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.010)** (0.014)** (0.015)**
Private 0.908 0.167 0.770 0.303 0.783 0.274 1.049 0.498 0.374 0.196 0.143 0.857
(0.242)** (0.146) (0.203)** (0.177) (0.216)** (0.169) (0.233)** (0.179)** (0.217) (0.161) (0.142) (0.227)**
Mixed 1.249 0.381 1.064 0.947 1.021 0.819 1.275 1.045 1.129 0.596 0.420 1.233
(0.205)** (0.124)** (0.171)** (0.149)** (0.182)** (0.143)** (0.205)** (0.152)** (0.182)** (0.135)** (0.120)** (0.192)**
alt wage97 0.680 0.576 0.562 0.614 0.585 0.584 0.720 0.682 0.623 0.573 0.538 0.665
(0.039)** (0.027)** (0.033)** (0.032)** (0.035)** (0.029)** (0.027)** (0.028)** (0.034)** (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.036)**
Moscow –0.308 –0.106 –0.359 –0.378 –0.260 –0.446 –0.308 –0.472 –0.300 –0.254 –0.182 –0.200
(0.254) (0.156) (0.213) (0.186)* (0.227) (0.178)* (0.254) (0.186)* (0.216) (0.168) (0.152) (0.238)
Chuvashia –1.026 –1.036 –1.391 –1.198 –1.319 –1.191 –1.026 –0.998 –1.150 –1.060 –1.108 –1.021
(0.293)** (0.176)** (0.244)** (0.211)** (0.260)** (0.204)** (0.293)** (0.214)** (0.248)** (0.194)** (0.171)** (0.274)**
Krasnoyarsk 0.118 1.056 –0.290 0.302 –0.149 0.286 0.118 –0.081 –0.009 0.548 0.938 0.620
(0.314) (0.189)** (0.262) (0.227) (0.279) (0.219) (0.314) (0.230) (0.267) (0.209)** (0.181)** (0.295)*
Construction –0.119 0.169 –0.326 –0.226 –0.163 –0.136 –0.119 0.049 –0.172 0.120 0.086 0.201
(0.235) (0.146) (0.198) (0.175) (0.210) (0.167) (0.235) (0.172) (0.200) (0.156) (0.141) (0.220)
Constant 0.999 1.652 1.971 1.575 1.834 1.800 0.999 0.679 1.610 1.686 1.968 0.950
(0.364)** (0.240)** (0.308)** (0.283)** (0.328)** (0.265)** (0.364)** (0.266)* (0.310)** (0.241)** (0.234)** (0.340)**
N 2354 2256 2294 2282 2326 2254 2354 2354 2347 2352 2354 2353
R
2 0.29 0.66 0.27 0.47 0.27 0.48 0.29 0.21
1 0.38 n.a. 0.66 0.37
Outliers 0 98 60 72 28 100 0 0 7 2 0 1
Notes: ** significant at the 1 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level; 
1Refers to a pseudo R
2.24
Table 4: Gross Outlier and Rest of Sample Compared
Full Sample Less Gross Outlier, i.e., 2,353 observations
Gross Outlier Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Wage 17.341 7.206 4.933 0. 029 58.393
Alternative wage 14.380 8.343 3.176 2.335 23.916
Profit 507694.7 6651.679 133706 –233775.2 6072081
Profit per worker 9579.145 20.238 458.465 –203.189 17585.85
Value added per
worker
9582.105 19.102 458.570 –215.458 17591.6
Employment 53 560.413 2320.851 1 73930
Table 5: Estimation using OLS 1996
1996 Full Sample Hadi &
Simonoff
Winsorising Minus One
Valad 96 0.001 0.312 0.320 0.115
(0.0004)* (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.009)**
Private*valad96 0.336 –0.069 –0.076 0.222
(0.012)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)**
Mixed*valad96 –0.001 –0.055 –0.076 –0.115
(0.0004) (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.009)**
Private –0.159 0.321 0.279 –0.058
(0.246) (0.144)* (0.137)* (0.239)
Mixed 1.096 0.498 0.395 1.207
(0.203)** (0.121)** (0.114)** (0.197)**
alt wage96 0.602 0.482 0.443 0.595
(0.039)** (0.027)** (0.024)** (0.038)**
Constant 1.571 2.053 2.435 1.462
(0.347)** (0.224)** (0.203)** (0.337)**
N 2330 2235 2330 2329
R
2 0.41 0.63 0.65 0.45
Notes: **significant at 1 per cent level, * 5 per cent level.25
Table 6: Estimation using OLS 1997
1997 Full Sample Hadi &
Simonoff
Winsorising Minus One
valad 97 0.001 0.339 0.340 0.270
(0.0004)* (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.015)**
private*valad97 0.071 –0.045 –0.073 –0.198
(0.007)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.016)**
mixed*valad97 –0.001 –0.061 –0.087 –0.270
(0.0004) (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)**
Private 0.908 0.167 0.143 0.857
(0.242)** (0.146) (0.142) (0.227)**
Mixed 1.249 0.381 0.420 1.233
(0.205)** (0.124)** (0.120)** (0.192)**
alt wage97 0.680 0.576 0.538 0.665
(0.039)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.036)**
constant 0.999 1.652 1.975 0.950
(0.364)** (0.240)** (0.234)** (0.340)**
N 2354 2255 2354 2353
R
2 0.29 0.66 0.66 0.37
Table 7: Estimation using instrumental variables, 1996
1996 Full Sample Hadi &
Simonoff
Winsorising Minus One
valad 96 0.008 0.313 0.151 0.120
(0.005) (2.013) (0.072)* (0.083)
private*valad96 0.314 0.123 0.148 0.183
(0.168) (1.496) (0.141) (0.183)
mixed*valad96 –0.007 3.481 0.130 –0.119
(0.005) (34.792) (0.146) (0.083)
private 0.095 0.139 0.007 0.183
(0.969) (4.120) (0.485) (0.911)
mixed 1.275 –7.757 0.174 1.310
(0.244)** (84.714) (0.388) (0.236)**
alt wage96 0.607 –0.775 0.458 0.624
(0.054)** (13.489) (0.059)** (0.048)**
constant 1.232 7.918 2.359 1.019
(0.452)** (64.018) (0.409)** (0.427)*
N 2022 1938 2022 2021
R
2 0.36 . 0.62 0.45
Note: A full stop in the R
2 box indicates that the calculated R
2 was negative and hence is not reported.26
Table 8: Estimation using instrumental variables, 1997
1997 Full Sample Hadi &
Simonoff
Winsorising Minus One
valad 97 0.001 0.429 0.388 0.349
(0.0004)* (0.025)** (0.014)** (0.031)**
private*valad97 0.226 –0.096 –0.100 –0.122
(0.016)** (0.029)** (0.019)** (0.034)**
mixed*valad97 0.000 –0.120 –0.097 –0.349
(0.001) (0.027)** (0.017)** (0.031)**
private 0.115 0.012 0.059 0.051
(0.278) (0.152) (0.145) (0.265)
mixed 1.216 0.267 0.313 1.198
(0.227)** (0.129)* (0.122)* (0.216)**
alt wage97 0.613 0.555 0.510 0.594
(0.043)** (0.028)** (0.027)** (0.041)**
constant 1.572 1.770 2.132 1.505
(0.407)** (0.247)** (0.236)** (0.387)**
N 2322 2226 2322 2321
R
2 0.13 0.65 0.66 0.21
Table 9: Estimation in First Differences, 1996–97
Full Sample Hadi &
Simonoff
Winsorising Minus One
diff valad 96 0.002 0.157 0.140 0.021
(0.003) (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.009)*
private*diff 0.068 –0.013 0.015 0.048
valad96 (0.007)** (0.017) (0.017) (0.011)**
mixed*diff –0.002 –0.031 –0.033 –0.021
valad96 (0.003) (0.016) (0.015)* (0.009)*
private –0.254 –0.078 –0.001 –0.282
(0.193) (0.097) (0.085) (0.193)
mixed 0.107 –0.027 0.050 0.081
(0.164) (0.083) (0.072) (0.165)
diff alt wage96 0.034 0.026 0.112 0.021
(0.153) (0.078) (0.074) (0.153)
constant 0.257 0.322 0.271 0.282
(0.221) (0.111)** (0.097)** (0.221)
N 2323 2218 2323 2322
R
2 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.0727
Appendix 1
Allowing the Alternative Wage to Vary with the Firm Wage
Below we rework Svejnar’s basic model for his estimating equation but allow Ya, the
alternative wage, to be a function of Y, the firm wage.
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In a two party framework the bargaining process is the maximisation of the above
equation. This leads to the following steps:
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In Svejnar (1986) this conjectural variation has a value of zero, but here we allow it to
vary. One would expect a priori that it would take a value between zero and one. If
groups of workers are primarily concerned with keeping their relative positions in
some kind of pay league then a value of one would imply unchanged positions in any
ranking and a value of less than one that ‘distance’ between groups of workers is
widening.
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This should be compared with the original Svejnar model below.
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The effect of assuming that the wage set by firm i has an impact on wages paid
elsewhere in the industry/region is to decrease the share of the surplus taken by the
insiders of firm i.29
Appendix 2
Residual Classification and Diagnostic/Robust Techniques
Standardisation of the Residuals
In the brief descriptions that follow there are several measures of residuals used. As
Greene (1993) points out, if one wishes to identify which residuals are significantly
large they should be standardised by dividing by the appropriate standard error for that
particular residual.
Studentisation refers to the division of a scale-dependent statistic by a scale estimate
that results in a statistic which is free of the nuisance scale parameters.
13 A further
distinction is between internal and external studentisation. In the former, the scale
statistic and the scale estimate are derived from the same data; in the latter they are
independent but the necessary information for the construction of the residual comes
from the fitting of the model using all the data to hand. For predicted residuals,
calculations are based on a fit that has taken place without including the i
th observation.
The same division between internal and external can then be made.
The Standardised Residual
One residual used in outlier identification is the standardised residual. (This is the term
the Stata Corporation use.) Hadi and Simonoff (1993) refer to this as the ‘internally
studentised residual’ and Cook and Weisberg (1982), while acknowledging it as an
internally studentised residual when referring to (1.1), simply adopt the term
‘studentised residual’.) It is defined as:
( ) ii h 1 s
i e
i e ˆ
-
= (A2.1)
hii represents the i
th diagonal element of the hat matrix H; s is the variance from the
sample residuals and ei is the ordinary residual.
Studentised Residual
A second residual used is the studentised residual. (This is what Hadi and Simonoff
refer to as the externally studentised residual.) It is defined as:
( ) ii
i
i
h 1 s
e
r
) i ( -
= (A2.2)
The (i) here refers to the fact that the standard error is calculated without using the i
th
observation. Hence the residual is independent from the standard error. s(i) is obtained
from:
                                                       
13 Cook and Weisberg (op. cit., p. 18).30
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where n is the number of observations and k the number of explanatory variables.
Predicted Residuals
The i
th predicted residual is found by estimating the given model without the i
th
observation and then using the least squares estimator of b to find the residual, i.e.,
( ) ( ) ( ) n   2,...,   1, i           ˆ e i T
i i i = - = b x y (A2.4)
The predicted error can then be divided by the standard error of the prediction to
obtain:
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where  i x  is a row vector of explanatory variables on the i
th observation and  ( ) i X
 
is
obtained from the matrix  X  by deleting the i
th row  T
i x . Moreover, the above scaled
predicted residual is equal to the externally studentised residual, i.e., r(i). As mentioned
in the main body of the text the coefficient on a dummy variable that has a one for the
i
th observation and zeros elsewhere will equal the predicted residual and the t statistic is
equal to the externally studentised residual.
We can link the internally and externally studentised residuals with the predicted
residuals. From the mean shift outlier model we know that:
( ) = i e
ii
i
h 1
e
-
(A2.6)
where e(i) is the predicted residual, ei the ordinary residual. The externally studentised
residual is given by:
( ) ii
i
i
h 1
e
r
) i ( s -
= (A2.7)
(A2.6) can be rearranged to give:
( ) ii i i i h 1 s r e - · = (A2.8)
Substituting and rearranging gives:31
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If we require the standard error with the i
th observation then we have
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= (A2.10)
where  ( ) i e ˆ is the internally studentised residual or the standardised residual.
Formulae for Outlier Detection
The basic formulae used in each of the outlier detection methods are given below along
with possible connections between the various methods. As will be seen, they make use
mainly of the studentised and the standardised residuals.
1) DFFITS (Welsch and Kuh, 1977 and Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980)
This measures the difference between the fitted value  y ˆ  of  y that results from
dropping a particular observation. If  ( ) i y ˆ  is the fitted value of  y  once the i
th
observation is deleted then the quantity  ( ) ( ) i y ˆ y ˆ - divided by the scaling factor  ( ) i iis h ,
where  ( ) i s is the estimator of  2 s  from a regression with the i
th observation omitted is
called DFFITS. It has been shown by Belsley et al.(1980) that:
( ) ii ii i i h 1 h r DFFITS - = (A2.11)
where ri are the studentised residuals. It should be noted that Belsley, Kuh and Welsch
do not actually suggest dropping outliers even if upon examination they prove to be
anomalous. Rather they suggest a bounded influence estimation where (to simplify)
Welsch (1980) suggests that the regression is run; DFFITS is calculated and on the
basis of the absolute value of DFFITS weights are attached by the following rule:
Minimize  ( ) ￿ -
2
i i i x y w b , where  1 wi =  if  34 . 0 DFFITS £  or 
DFFITS
34 . 0
wi = if
DFFITS >0.34. If we had pursued this approached then this would have placed this in
the robust category since it is clearly an attempt to accommodate outliers and
influential observations. In our study we merely adopt the suggested cutoff value
2￿(k/n).
2) Cook’s Distance (Cook, 1977)
Cook’s Distance is given by:
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where k is the number of variables including the constant in the regression, s is the root
mean square error of the regression and s(i) is the root mean square error of the
regression with the i
th observation omitted.
3) Welsch’s Distance
Welsch’s Distance is given by:
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Values of Cook’s distance greater than 4/n should be examined (Bollen and Jackman,
1990). Following similar logic, the cut-off for Welsch’s Distance is approximately 3￿k
(Chatterjee and Hadi, 1988).
4) Covratio
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This measure is the ratio of the determinants of the covariance matrix, with and
without the i
th observation. Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that observations
for which
n
k 3
1 covratioi ‡ - (A2.15)
should be investigated further. In the calculation of outliers using the above procedures
the recommended cut-off points were used.
5) Hadi Process (Hadi and Simonoff, 1993)
The Hadi and Simonoff procedure (HSP) firstly involves identifying an initial clean
subset M, initially of size h = integer part of (n + k –1)/2. Hadi and Simonoff (1993)
propose two methods of identifying the initial subset. With the first method, M1, the
dataset is divided into a basic subset that contains the first k + 1 observations and a
non-basic subset that contains the remaining (n – k – 1) observations. This is done after
fitting a regression model to the whole dataset and then ordering the n observations
according to some regression diagnostic, say, the absolute value of the adjusted
residual, which is defined as 
ii h 1
i e
i e ˆ
-
= . Run a regression on the subset B, i.e., the
basic subset. Compute 
ii h 1
i e
i e ˆ
-
=  if  B i ˛  and
ii h 1
i e
i e ˆ
+
=  if  B i ˇ  and
arrange the observations in ascending order. The size of the basic subset, s, is increased
by one observation to s + 1. Repeat the above. When the size of the basic subset equals
h substitute the first h observations for M and go to step 2 of their main algorithm (see
below). M2, the second method is left for the cited reference. M1 is described in detail
here since Hadi and Simonoff found that it was more powerful in the presence of high33
leverage outliers compared to M2 but there was little difference in the presence of low
leverage outliers.
In the second step of their algorithm the following is calculated:
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Following this the observations are arranged in ascending order according to  i d .
Under the normality assumption and if  M ˆ b  and  M ˆ s are independent then the  i d ’s
follow a t-distribution with s – k degrees of freedom for each subset M of size s and for
B iˇ .
14
a) If  ( ) ( ) k s , 1 s 2 1 s t d - + + ‡ a , then declare all observations satisfying
( ) k s , 1 s 2 i t d - + ‡ a as outliers and stop.
b) Otherwise, form a new subset M by taking the first s + 1 ordered observations
and go to step two of the algorithm. If n = s + 1, then declare no outliers in the
data and stop.
Using the above process Hadi and Simonoff demonstrate that their process is effective
in detecting multiple outliers and maintain that their method is less affected by masking
and swamping problems compared to other methods
Robust Estimation
There are various robust estimators that may be employed. Our selection is based as
much on convenience as anything else in terms of those procedures that are already
‘canned’ in econometric software packages (with the exception of the Rousseeuw and
Leroy procedure). A brief, general introduction to robust regression with a good list of
books and articles at the end of the relevant chapter can be found in Draper and Smith
(1998).
1) Median Least Squares (MLS)
Whereas in ordinary regression the object is to estimate the mean of the dependent
variable in MLS the object is to estimate the median of the dependent variable. The
median regression finds a line that minimises the sum of the absolute residuals rather
                                                       
14 As Hadi and Simonoff point out  M ˆ b  and  M ˆ s  are dependent and since both are determined from a
preliminary examination of the data the estimate of  M s ˆ  is biased downwards. That said the authors
feel that the t-distribution provides a useful benchmark for establishing cut-off values.34
than the sum of the squares of the residuals as in OLS, i.e., minimise, with respect to
the elements of b .
( ) b T
i i Y Median x -
It is usual to see a pseudo R
2 reported with MLS. This is calculated as
1 – (the sum of the absolute deviations about the predicted Y)/ (the raw sum of
absolute deviations about the unconditional median)
A more rigorous procedure advocated by Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) is explained
below. While MLS results are reported, results based on this procedure are also
reported below.
2) Reweighted Least Squares (Rousseeuw and Leroy Procedure)
The following procedure does not appear explicitly in full within the book by
Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) but is taken from various parts of the book.
Step 1. Run MLS.
15
Step 2. Calculate a preliminary scale estimate S
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where ri is the residual, n the sample size and p the number of explanatory variables.
Step 3. Calculate the standardised residuals  0
i
s
r .
Step 4. Determine the weights  i w  for the i
th observation based on
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Step 5. Calculate the scale estimate for LMS regression using 
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Step 6. Standardise the residuals using s
*. If  5 . 2 r
*
i > s  investigate the observation as
a possible outlier.
                                                       
15 Strictly speaking the dataset should be standardised before the above procedure is carried out. This
makes the variables dimensionless and so helps avoid numerical inaccuracies caused by different units
of measurement. Rousseeuw and Leroy recommend that the median of the j
th variable is subtracted
from the i
th observation on the j
th variable. This in turn is divided by the median of the absolute
deviations from the median multiplied by the correction factor  ( ) 4826 . 1 75 . 0
1
1 » - f
. After MLS
the results, of course, have to be transformed back. The Stata command qreg with its default setting is
MLS but qreg does not transform the variables to be dimensionless (personal e-mail from Stata’s
technical support 22/4/99). Whether by transforming the data as suggested by Rousseeuw and Leeroy
would have made a great deal of difference to the final results reported is open to question.35
Step 7. Carry out reweighted least squares (RLS). In effect OLS except on the reduced
dataset formed on the basis of deleting observations deemed outliers in step 6 above.
3) Winsorising
This is similar to the so-called a-trimmed mean, which is simply the mean of the
sample after the proportion a of the largest and smallest observations have been
deleted from the data. However, the Winsorised mean, rather than discarding the
proportion a, ‘accumulates’ them at either end of the truncation point. In the
regressions run using the Winsorising technique the largest and smallest 5 per cent of
observations were ‘Winsorised’.
4) Non Linear Least Squares
If transforming variables by taking natural logarithms can lessen the impact of outliers
it might be worth exploring whether estimating the model by non-linear least squares
assuming a k shifted log normal errors might lessen the impact of influential
observations within the dataset. The specification is as follows.
( ) [ ] ( ) i 2 1 0 k wage   e alternativ 97 valad ln k wage ln n b b b + - + + = -
In running the regression k is given a value of zero, which is the case of proportion
errors since the standard error of the response variable, here the log of the firm wage,
is proportional to its expected value.
5) Robust Regression
In this procedure implemented by the statistical package Stata, Cook’s Distance, D, is
first calculated (see above) and then any observations from the regression which have a
D larger than 1 are excluded. An iterative procedure then follows where weights are
calculated on the basis of the residuals and then the regression is repeated. The process
stops when the maximum change in weights drops below a certain level. There are two
weight functions used: 1) Huber weights and 2) biweights. Both are used since Huber
weights have problems dealing with severe outliers while biweights sometimes fail to
converge or have multiple solutions.
16
A. Huber weights
The i
th scaled residual is calculated from 
s
e
u
i
i =  where ei is the ordinary residual and
6745 . 0
M
s =  is the residual scale estimate and  ( ) ( ) i i e med e med M - =  is the median
absolute deviation from the median residual. The case weights are given by
h i i c u if    1 w £ =  if not then  i h i u c w =  where ch  = 1.345. So downweighting starts
when the absolute value of a residual exceeds (1.345/ 0.6745)M which is about 2M.
                                                       
16 This brief summary is taken from the Stata Reference Manual, volume 3, Release 4, p. 135.36
B. Biweights
All observations with non-zero residuals receive some downweighting using the
following smoothly decreasing biweight function.
( ) [ ] h i
2 2
b i i c u if c u 1 w £ - =  or 0 otherwise
where cb = 4.685 (tuning value)/7. The tuning value can be altered with higher tuning
constants producing milder downweighting and lower ones giving more drastic
downweighting to the residuals. In the robust regression results reported the default
setting of 7 was used.